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OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
Larry L. Greer appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, in which he alleged a violation of his constitutional rights.  The
District Court did not address the merits of the claim but rather dismissed the suit for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997(e)(a).
1Exceptions to the general rule of conversion have been made where the materials
considered at the dismissal stage are either public records deemed to be undisputably
authentic or materials directly relied upon in the plaintiff’s complaint. See eg Southern
Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426-27
(3d Cir. 1999); City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir.
1998); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
Cir. 1993).
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The relevant provision of the PLRA states that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
(42 U.S.C. §1983) or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
42 U.S.C. §1997(e)(a).  While the District Court concluded correctly that the PLRA
exhaustion provision applies to the plaintiff, the Court erred by granting the defendants’
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust solely on the basis of representations made in an
affidavit submitted by the defendants.  Subject to a few narrow exceptions not applicable in
this case,1 Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a District Court to
convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment if the Court considers
materials outside the plaintiff’s pleading, such as the affidavit relied upon in this case.  Camp
v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000).  
The Rule directs that
[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
-4-
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); See also, e.g., Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972). In the
present case, the District Court considered material outside of the pleadings and, therefore,
should have converted the motion for dismissal to a summary judgment motion, allowing the
plaintiff an opportunity for appropriate discovery and “a reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent” to the motion.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
Accordingly, we vacate the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice and remand for further proceedings to determine whether the defendants sustained
their burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all available administrative
remedies in accordance with the PLRA exhaustion requirement. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d
287 (3d Cir. 2002).
